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CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
Physicians and Surgeons-Sullivan v. O'Connor: A Liberal
View of the Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons
I. INTRODUCTION
"Malpractice" has become a shibboleth of the lawyer's trade, but
its legal siblings,' especially breach of contract, have received less atten-
tion-partly because there are fewer cases on point and in :part because
lawyers have been reluctant to bring actions in contract against doctors.
This reluctance may be attributed to a variety of reasons, including the
attitude of courts, statutes of limitation, burdens of proof and damages
recoverable.
Attorneys' timidity in using actions for breach of contract against
physicians may wane, however, once the profession gets wind of cases
like Sullivan v. O'Connor,2 recently decided by the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts. Plaintiff, Alice Sullivan, brought an action
against James O'Connor for negligence and breach of contract. The
parties had entered into an agreement whereby defendant promised to
perform two operations to correct plaintiff's long and prominent nose.
In fact, three operations were necessary, and plaintiff's nose, instead of
being enhanced, became concave at midpoint, as well as flattened,
bulbous, and asymetrical at the tip. Nor could its present condition be
corrected by further surgery.3 The Massachusetts court, speaking
through Judge Kaplan, upheld a lower court decision dismissing the
negligence claim and awarding 13,500 dollars on the claim for breach
of contract. Damages included out-of-pocket expenses, damages "flow-
ing directly, naturally, proximately, and forseeably" from the breach
(the jury was permitted to take into account the mental effects on
plaintiff, with consideration given to her occupation as an entertainer),
as well as pain and suffering for the third operation, but not the first
two. Since plaintiff was able to continue her work, no compensation
was granted for loss of earnings.4
The court found the measure of damages consistent with either an
expectancy or reliance theory of recovery.5 The former would measure
1. Other theories that plaintiffs may use to recover against defendant-physicians
include battery, fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.
2. 363 Mass. 579, 296 N.E.2d 183 (1973).
3. Id. at 580, 296 N.E.2d at 184-85.
4. Id. at 579-81, 296 N.E.2d at 185.
5. Id. at 588-89, 296 N.E.2d at 189.
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the value of expectancy which the promise created, i.e., the difference
between the present and promised condition of plaintiff's nose; the latter
the extent to which plaintiff had changed her previous position in
reliance on the defendant's promise, i.e., restoration of the status quo
ante.6 As to the reliance interest, the court contended:
Suffering or distress resulting from the breach going beyond that
which was envisioned by the treatment as agreed, should be com-
pensable on the same ground as the worsening of the patient's con-
dition because of the breach. Indeed it can be argued that the
very suffering "contracted for"--that which would have been in-
curred if the treatment achieved the promised result-should also
be compensable on the theory underlying the New York cases
[reliance measure of damages]. For the suffering is "wasted" if the
treatment fails . .. .
Since neither damages for pain and suffering for the first two operations
nor the difference between the promised and present condition of the
nose was asked, the court was not forced to choose between the two
theories of recovery.8
In compensating plaintiff for pain and suffering during the third
operation, the Massachusetts court went beyond a restitution measure of
damages (restoring to plaintiff any value conferred on defendant, or,
more simply stated, out-of-pocket expenses9), and introduced an ele-
ment of loss traditionally restricted to tort liability.10
It. IMPLIED CONTRACTS
As the problem of damages illustrates, the line between torts and
contracts is often obscure. There are some delineations, however, and
certain general patterns can be discerned. To begin with, in the ab-
sence of an express contract, the physician or surgeon is neither a
warrantor of cures nor an insurer of results." There is ample authority
6. For a full discussion of contract theories of recovery, see the now classic article
by L. Fuller & W. Perdue on Reliance Interests in Contract Damages (pts. 1-2), 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 373 (1936).
7. 363 Mass. at 588, 296 N.E.2d at 189.
8. Id. at 589, 296 N.E.2d at 189-90.
9. L. Fuller & W. Perdue, supra note 6, at 53-54.
10. The authorities are in conflict over permitting recovery for pain and suffering
in actions for breach of contract. Against recovery: Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659,
54 So. 60 (1910); Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955). Allowing
recovery: Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957); Hood v. Moffett,
109 Miss. 757, 69 So. 664 (1915); 5A Pn.RsoNAL INJuty § 1.03, at 69 (L. Frumer ed.
Supp. 1975).
11. Alexandridis v. Jewett, 388 F.2d 829 (1st Cir. 1968); Thompson v. Lillehei,
273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1973);
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to this effect, including the eminent torts authority William Prosser.
According to Professor Prosser:
A physician may, although he seldom does, contract to cure his
patient, or to accomplish a particular result, in which case he may
be liable for breach of contract when he does not succeed. In the
absence of such an express agreement, he does not warrant or in-
sure the outcome of his treatment, and he will not be liable for
an honest mistake of judgment, where the proper course is open
to reasonable doubt.12
An equally celebrated authority in the field of contracts, Samuel Willis-
ton, is in agreement: "In the absence of an express agreement, there is
no guaranty that a course of treatment or an operation will be success-
ful.
1 3
Although a physician is not an insurer of results in the absence of
an express contract, the law implies a contract that he will employ the
learning, skill and experience ordinarily possessed by others of his
profession.' 4  But in Steel v. Aetna Life and Casualty 5 the Court of
Appeal of Louisiana overturned previous state decisions and held that a
medical malpractice claim could not be brought under contract theory
unless the physician promised a particular result. In Steel plaintiff
merely alleged that defendant physician had breached an implied con-
tract to use a high degree of skill and care.
Indeed, one may pause and wonder why actions for breach of
implied contracts are ever brought at all, since torts damages are gener-
ally greater. Actions on implied contracts have persisted for two rea-
sons:"e statutes of limitation for contract actions are, with few excep-
tions, longer than those for tort actions; and there are rare cases in
which the contract measure of damages (putting plaintiff in as good
a position as he would have been had the contract been performed 7)
Alexander v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 276 So. 2d 794 (La. App.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973); Hestback v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 212
N.W.2d 361 (1973); Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N.H. 460 (1853); Dickens v. Everhart, 284
N.C. 85, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973).
12. W. PRossER, HANDBOoK OF THE LAw op ToRTs 162 (4th ed. 1971).
13. 10 S. WiLXsToN, CoNTRACTs § 1286, at 946 (3d ed. 1967).
14. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955); Champion v.
Keith, 17 Okla. 204, 87 P. 845 (1906); 61 AM. Ju. 2d Physicians, Suigeons, and Other
Healers § 99 (1972).
15. 304 So. 2d 861 (La. App. 1974).
16. 1 D. LOUmsELL & H. WmLMS, MnnxcA MXAcrEm 8.03, at 197-98
(1973).
17. 5 A. CommrN, CoNmACrs § 1002 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 329,
comment a (1932).
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may exceed the tort measure (allowing for pain and suffering, impaired
earning capacity, loss of time and consequential damages"").
III. ExPREss CONTRACTS
Physicians, like every legitimate heir of Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence, have the freedom to contract. And when physicians enter into
an express agreement to achieve a particular result or to adhere to
specific standards and procedures, an action will lie for its breach-an
action distinct from malpractice and dissimilar in theory, proof and
damages recoverable. 19 Whether an express promise was made, orally
or otherwise, is a question for the trier of fact.20
What constitutes an express agreement in medicine, however, is
somewhat of a legal thicket, and more than one court has found itself
lured by attorneys into a briar patch of ambiguous evidence. In Hack-
worth v. Hart,' for example, a Kentucky court found defendant physi-
cian's assurance that an operation was a "fool-proof thing 100%" to be
evidence of an express agreement to achieve particular results. In
Maercklein v. Smith,22 on the other hand, a patient contracted with
defendant physician to perform a circumcision; the physician arranged
for another doctor to handle the surgery, and a vasectomy was per-
formed instead. The Colorado court found no contract.2  Yet in
Johnston v. Rodis24 a federal court found a psychiatrist's unqualified
remark that shock treatments were "perfectly safe" might be construed
as a warranty.
Most courts have held that whether a contract was made depends
not only on what was said but also under what circumstances it was
18. Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 413, 424 [hereinafter cited as Miller].
19. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1st Dist. 1967);
Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961); Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197
A.2d 627 (1964); Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Robins v.
Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
20. Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 P. 573 (1923); Marcblewicz v.
Stanton, 50 Mich. App. 344, 213 N.W.2d 317 (1973).
21. 474 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
22. 129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954).
23. Other cases finding evidence insufficient to constitute a contract include:
Marvin v. Talbott, 216 Cal. App. 2d 383, 30 Cal. Rptr. 893 (4th Dist. 1963); Bria v.
St. Joseph's Hosp., 153 Conn. 626, 220 A.2d 29 (1966); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d
609 (Iowa 1973); Miller v. Dore, 154 Me. 363, 148 A.2d 692 (1959); Carney v. Lydon,
36 Wash. 2d 878, 220 P.2d 894 (1950).
24. 251 F.2d 917, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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said." A rather remarkable case is that of Nicholson v. Han,12 6 in
which plaintiff alleged that defendant physician offered to resolve plain-
tiff's marital problems, guaranteeing that the situation would improve
and noting his success in similar cases with other patients. Plaintiff
contended that defendant breached the contract by seducing his wife
and encouraging her to seek a divorce. The court held the cuckolded
petitioner had no action in contract, and, in fact, no cause of action at
all, since criminal offenses for alienation of affections and criminal
conversations had been abolished in Michigan! 27
In addition to proof of warranty, some courts have required that a
contract to cure be supported by separate consideration.2 8 :[n Wilson v.
Blair,29 for instance, the Supreme Court of Montana ruled that a physi-
cian's guarantee to make plaintiff's hand "100 per cent efficient" was
unenforcible for want of consideration since the warranty was made af-
ter the agreement to pay. This holding is contrary to the general rule of
contract law that a single consideration may support several promises;80
moreover separate consideration need not be proved if the plaintiff has
relied to his detriment on the defendant's promise.31
In determining what constitutes a contract, courts have been walk-
ing an evidentiary tightrope between words of agreement and expres-
sions of opinion. In so doing, they have tried to balance the legitimate
need to give patients "therapeutic reassurance" against the right of
individuals to enter into contracts and have those contracts enforced.
Needless to say, their performance has drawn less than unanimous
applause from scholars, practitioners, and the bench.
It is clear that something less than the words "guarantee" or
"warranty" and something more than the mere expression of medical
opinion will establish an express contract. Drawing the line will not be
easy, but if caution is the better part of wisdom in these cases, the
25. E.g., Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
26. 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
27. Id. at 39-40, 162 N.W.2d at 315.
28. E.g., Gault v. Sideman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 96, 106-07, 191 N.E.2d 436, 441
(1963); 61 AM. Jun. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 149 (1972). But cf.
Doerr v. Villate, 74 Ill. App. 2d 332, 220 N.E.2d 767 (1966); Guilmet v. Campbell, 385
Mich. 57, 66-67, 188 N.W.2d 601, 605-06 (1971).
29. 65 Mont. 155, 157-58, 211 P. 289, 291 (1922).
30. 1 A. CoRB N, CONTRACTS § 125, at 183 (1963).
31. 1 A. CoRBIN, CONTRAcs § 194, at 280 (1963); RrSTATEmENr (SwcoND) ov
CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965); Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Express
Warranty of Particular Results of an Operation, 41 TENN. L.R. 964, 971 (1974). But
cf. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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plaintiff should be required to sustain a strict burden of proof, a burden
stricter than that required by the Massachusetts court in Sullivan.
IV. PLEADINGS: TORT OR CONTRACT?
Most states today, with few exceptions, proscribe the bringing of
malpractice actions on an implied contract theory,,2 even though
some courts have held that the existence of a contract furnishes
the basis for tort liability; that is, the duty arises from a contract of
employment. 33 Other courts have discovered that the duty of physicians
to use skill and care arises not only out of an implied contract, but also
out of public considerations predicated on the consensual transaction
between patient and physician. 4 Judge John Minor Wisdom has stated
this view with particular clarity:
It is the nature of the duty breached that should determine whether
the.action is in tort or contract. To determine the duty one must
examine the patient-physician relationship. It is true that usually
a consensual relationship exists and the physician agrees impliedly
to treat the patient in a proper manner. Thus, a malpractice suit
is inextricably bound up with the idea of breach of implied con-
tract. However, the patient-physician relationship, and the cor-
responding duty that is owed, is not one that is completely de-
pendent upon a contract theory . . . . The duty of due care is
imposed by law and is something over and above any contractual
duty. . . . The duty is owed in all cases, and a breach of this
duty constitutes a tort. On principle then, we consider a malprac-
tice action as tortious in nature whether the duty grows out of a
contractual relation or has no origin in contract. .... .
32. Comment, The Implied Contract Theory of Malpractice Recovery, 6 WmLA-
ME= L.J. 275 (1970). The minority states, which allow plaintiffs to bring a
malpractice action on a theory of implied contract, are: Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Louisiana. Id. at 275 n.3. In addition, twenty-five state legislatures have ruled
that malpractice actions must be brought in tort and not contract; they are: Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and West
Virginia. Id. at 278 n.22.
Some early cases denying recovery on an implied contract theory include: Brown v.
Moore, 247 F.25 711 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957); Carpenter v. Walker,
170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910); Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159 (1847); Whittaker v.
Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25 N.W. 632 (1885). Contra, Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va.
252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).
33. E.g., Daily v. Somberg, 49 N.J. Super. 469, 140 A.2d 429, 434 (Law
Div.), rev'd on other grounds, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A.2d 676 (1958).
34. E.g., Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727, 89 S.E.2d 809 (1955).
35. Kozan v. Comstock, 270 F.2d 839, 84445 (5th Cir. 1959). Contra, Creighton
v. Karlin, 225 So. 2d 288 (La. Ct. App. 1969); Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So. 2d 186 (La.
Ct. App. 1964).
[Vol. 54
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
Nonetheless, an action for breach of an express contract may lie which is
entirely separate from one for malpractice, even though both result from
the same transaction: 36 the former is derived from a contract of employ-
ment, the latter from a contract to use the professional standard of due
care. Whether an action is in tort or contract depends on the
construction given the pleadings and the gravamen of the action.3 7
Because courts determine the cause of action not by the form, but
by the substance of pleadings, attorneys must be careful when drafting a
complaint to establish an express promise and its breach." In Breaux
v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 9 for example, plaintiff brought
suit against a physician for negligence in administering a drug known as
Kantrex which caused an impairment of plaintiff s hearing. A federal
court found that in the absence of a guarantee by the doctor, the claim
was one in tort. Similar results have been reached by courts in other
cases: in Loudon v. Scott4" the patient died when the doctor adminis-
tered an anesthetic while the patient was intoxicated; in Liebler v. Our
Lady of Victory Hospital1 an action for breach of contract was brought
against defendant hospital and three physicians for injuries resulting
from a delivery. In both cases the actions were deemed to be ones for
negligence rather than for breach of contract.42
When there is evidence of a special agreement and the plaintiff has
relied on the agreement to his detriment, courts have upheld an action in
contract. In Stitt v. Gold 3 a New York court found a contract action
36. 61 AM. Jun. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 176 (2d ed. 1972).
In an often quoted decision, a New York court has said: "Malpractice is predicated
upon the failure to exercise requisite medical skills and is tortious in nature. The action
in contract is based upon a failure to perform a special agreement. Negligence, the basis
of one, is foreign to the other." Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794, 795
(1949).
37. Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61 (1961); Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich.
App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968); Burnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d 1029
(1931); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 57 (1951).
38. Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221, 1227 (1972). For an example of an attorney's
failure properly to amend his pleadings, see Gault v. Sideman, 42 IM. App. 2d 96, 191
N.E.2d 436 (1963).
39. 272 F. Supp. 668 (E.D. La. 1967).
40. 58 Mont. 645, 194 P. 488 (1920).
41. 43 App. Div. 2d 898, 351 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1974).
42. Accord, Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659, 54 So. 60 (1910); Brown v. Wood,
202 So. 2d 125 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Barnhoff v. Aldridge, 327 Mo. 767, 38 S.W.2d
1029 (1931); Pearl v. Lesnick, 20 App. Div. 2d 761, 247 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1964) (assault
and battery); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App. Div. 845, 169 N.Y.S. 15 (1918); Darby v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 436 S.W.2d 439 (Tenn. 1969). Contra, Hays v. Hall, 477
S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd on other grounds, 488 S.W.2d 412 (1972).
43. 33 Misc. 2d 273, 225 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 17 App. Div. 2d 631, 230
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1962).
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when the defendant physician breached an agreement to perform
certain tests and operations assuring the plaintiff that he would be cured
within three weeks. In Greenwald v. Grayson"4 an action was brought
against a physician for failure to recognize a congenital disease in a child
and advise the plaintiffs of the fitness of the child for adoption. The
District Court of Appeals of Florida found no physician-patient relation-
ship and held that plaintiff could recover only in contract.4
It is noteworthy that some courts have held that when the doctor
does not perform at all, i.e. a case of nonfeasance, the action may be
brought in contract rather than tort." This view of tort liability seems
to be erroneous. The better solution would be to find liability for a
negligent omission in the commission of a larger act, that of treating the
patient. An analogy exists in the field of products liability where a
failure to inspect an automobile is viewed not as a case of nonfeasance
but as a case of misfeasance in the manufacture of the car.4 7
In an action which sounds in both tort and contract the plaintiff
need not elect his remedy. In Bell v. Sigal4 a Georgia court held that
"'A plaintiff may pursue any number of consistent or inconsistent reme-
dies against the same person or different persons until he shall obtain a
satisfaction from some of them.' , In accord is rule 8(e)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing the consistency of plead-
ings. 50
To determine whether an action sounds in contract or tort, courts
have looked beyond the words of the complaint to the nature of the
action. The type of damages asked and the specific phrases used in
alleging a contract are significant factors, to be sure, but singular
44. 189 So. 2d 204, 205 (Fla. App. 1966).
45. See also Lane v. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N.E. 1111 (1891) (unskillful
treatment of plaintiff's wife during childbirth); Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6, 367 P.2d 61
(1961) (special contract that surgery would not worsen plaintiff's condition). Accord-
ing to one commentator: "Mhis decision [Noel v. Proud], interpreting the doctor's
alleged statement as a warranty, has taken something essentially in the nature of advice
and opinion and transmuted it into a statement of fact." 37 Nom DAME LAw. 725, 728
(1962).
46. E.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 163 So. 2d 186 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
47. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
48. 129 Ga. App. 249, 199 S.E.2d 355 (1973).
49. Id. at 249, 199 S.E.2d at 356, quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 3-114 (1975).
50. "A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or
defenses. . . . A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has
regardless of consistency. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2).
892 [Vol. 54
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attention to the wording of a complaint has gone the way of the common
law writ.5 '
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The nature of the cause of action is crucial in medical malpractice
cases since it determines the applicable statute of limitations.5 2 In only
one state is the statute of limitations period longer for malpractice
(torts) than for contracts; 53 in five states and the District of Columbia,
the periods are identical;54 in eleven other states, there are statutes that
refer to all malpractice actions, whether brought in contract or tort;5 5 in
the remaining thirty-three states the prescribed period for bringing suit
is longer for contracts than torts.56
51. Baatz v. Smith, 361 Mich. 68, 76, 104 N.W.2d 787, 791 (1960).
52. For an analysis of attempts to circumvent the statute of limitations for tort by
using an action for breach of contract, see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limita-
tions in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 339, 347-52, 361-63
(1962).
53. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1972) (other actions including mapratice, six
years), Id. § 15-1-29 (contracts, three years).
54. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-301(8) (1973) (other actions including malpractice,
three years), Id. § 12-301(7) (contracts, three years); MD. CODE ANN. COURTS &
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS § 5-101 (civil actions, three years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5)
(Cum. Supp. 1975) (personal injuries, three years), Id. § 1-52(1) (contracts, three
years); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-143(1) (1962) (contracts, six years), Id. § 10-143(5)
(personal injuries, six years); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(6) (1958) (torts,
two years), Id. art. 5526(4) (unwritten contracts, two years); WASH. Rnv. CODE ANN. §
4.16.080(2) (1962) (personal injuries, three years), Id. § 4.16.080(3) (unwritten
contracts, three years).
55. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 25(1) (Cur. Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-205
(1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-105 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4)(b)
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 5-219(4) (1947), as amended IDAHo CODE § 5-219(4)
(Cum. Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. SAT. § 34-4-19-1 (Bums 1973); MAss. ANN. LAws ch.
260, § 4 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (1945); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4
(Supp. 1975), amending N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (1968); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.11(D)(3) (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPLED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-15.1 (Supp. 1975),
amending S.D. COMPiLED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-15(3) (1967).
56. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1973) (personal injuries, two years), Id. §
09.10.050(1) (contracts, six years); Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-542(B) (Supp. 1975),
amending Ala. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-542 (1956) (malpractice torts, two years after
discovery, maximum of six years after date of injury), Id. § 12-543(1) (1956) (unwrit-
ten contracts, three years); CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE. § 340(3) (1954) (negligence, one
year), Id. § 339(1) (unwritten contracts, two years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584
(Supp. 1975) (malpractice, two years after discovery, maximum 3 years after date of
injury), amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (1958), Id. § 52-576 (contracts,
three years), amending CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-576 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 8119 (1974) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 8106 (contracts, three years);
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-1004 (1975) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 3-706 (contracts,
four years); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 657-7.3 (Supp. 1975) (medical torts, two years after
discovery, maximum six years), Id. § 657-1(1) (contracts, six years); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 16 (oral contracts,
five years); IowA CODE ANN. § 614.1(9) (Supp. 1976) (malpractice, two years after
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When the action is based on implied contract, there are currently
three views on choosing the appropriate statute of limitations: that the
statute for tort actions applies notwithstanding evidence showing a
contract;57 that the statute for contracts applies when the action purports
to be in contract;58 that malpractice gives rise to two causes of action,
contract and tort, and the controlling factor is not the form but the
discovery, maximum of six years after negligent act), amending IOWA CODE ANN § 614.1
(1950), Id. § 614.1(4) (unwritten contracts, five years); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
513(4) (Supp. 1975) (personal injury, two years after discovery, maximum of ten years
after date of negligent act), Id. § 60-512(1) (1964) (contracts, three years); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 413.140(e) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (negligence actions against physicians, one
year), Id. § 413.120(1) (1972) (unwritten contracts, five years); LA. STAT. ANN. Civ.
CODE art. 3536 (1973) (offenses or quasi offenses, one year), Id. art. 3544 (all personal
actions, ten years); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. fit. 14, § 753 (1964) (malpractice, two years),
Id. § 752 (civil actions, six years); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A-5805(3) (1962) (malprac-
tice, two years), Id. § 27A-5807(8) (contracts, five years); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140
(Vernon 1949) (medical malpractice, two years after negligent act), Id. § 516.120 (con-
tracts, five years); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-2624 (Supp. 1975) (medical malprac-
tice, three years after accrual of action or discovery, maximum of five years from date of
injury), Id. § 93-2604(1) (unwritten contracts, five years); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-208
(1964) (malpractice, two years), Id. § 25-206 (1964) (unwritten contracts, four years),
NEV. REv. STAT. § 11.400 (1975) (medical malpractice, two years after discovery, maxi-
mum of four years after date of injury), Id. § 11.190(2) (c) (1973) (unwritten contract,
four years); N.J. STAT. ANN. § '2A: 14-2 (1952) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 2A:
14-1 (contracts, six years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-8 (1953) (personal injuries, three
years), Id. § 23-1-4 (unwritten contracts, four years); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 214-a (1975)
(medical malpractice, two and one-half years), amending N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 214 (1972),
Id. § 213(2) (1972) (contracts, six years); N.D. CEw. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (Supp.
1975) (malpractice, two years from accrual of action, maximum of six years from date
of injury), amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(3) (1974), Id. § 28-01-16(1) (1974)
(contracts, six years); OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(3) (1960) (personal injuries not
on contract, two years), Id. § 95(2) (unwritten contracts, three years); ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 12.110(4) (1975) (injuries resulting from medical treatment, two years after discov-
ery, maximum of five years after date of treatment), Id. § 12.080(1) (contracts, five
years); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1953) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 31
(contracts, six years); I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1975) (personal injuries,
three years), Id. § 9-1-13 (1969) (civil actions, six years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304
(Supp. 1975) (personal torts, one year), Id. § 28-309 (1955) (contracts, six years);
UTAH CODE Am. § 78-12-28(3) (Supp. 1975) (medical malpractice, two years after
discovery, maximum of ten years after date of injury), amending UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
12-25 (1953), Id. § 78-12-25 (1953) (unwritten contracts, four years); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 512(4) (1973) (personal injuries, three years), Id. § 511 (civil actions, six
years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (Cum. Supp. 1975), amending VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24
(1950) (personal injuries, two years), Id. § 8-13 (contracts, three years); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-2-12 (1966) (personal injuries, three years), Id. (unwritten contracts, five
years); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 893.205 (1966) (personal injuries, three years), Id. §
893.19(3) (contracts, six years); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-18 (1957) (torts, four years), Id.
§ 1-17 (unwritten contracts, eight years). For a further discussion of the statutes in the
various states, see D. LouisELL & H. WxLIAms, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 13.13-.64
(1973).
57. E.g., Lewis v. Owen, 395 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1968).
58. E.g., Cherry v. Falvey, 188 Ark. 827, 68 S.W.2d 98 (1934).
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substance of the action.59 Generally the tort statute will be applied
unless there is an express agreement to cure;60 the prevailing view, and
the modem trend, is to determine which statute governs by looking to
the substance rather than the form of the action.61
A few cases have held that the prescriptive period for torts or a
special statute for personal injury actions governs whether the form of
action is one for negligence or for breach of contract. 2  Similarly,
actions for wrongful death are limited by a special statutory period,
rather than the generally shorter period for malpractice.63  In the case
of an express contract, however, courts may apply the statute of limita-
tions for contract actions, 64 with the statute running from the date of
breach rather than the date damages are incurred."5
The recent trend in determining which statute of limitations gov-
erns is sound: in the case of express agreements to cure, the contracts
59. E.g., Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N.Y.S. 529, afI'd mem., 254
N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1930). See Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320, 325 (1961).
60. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 306, 57 P.2d 908, 910 (1936); Hundt v.
Burhans, 13 I1. App. 3d 415, 300 N.E.2d 318 (1973); Kauchick v. Williams, 435 S.W.2d
342 (Mo. 1968); Cloutier v. Kasheta, 105 N.H. 262, 197 A.2d 627 (1964); Lakeman v.
LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 156 A.2d 123 (1959); Mamunes v. Williamsburgh Gen. Hosp.,
28 App. Div. 2d 998, 283 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1967); 5A PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 10, at
80-81. See 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WiLLiAmS, MEDICAL MALPRAcncE 13.03, at 366-67
(1973).
61. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 320, 326 (1961); 5A PERSONAL INJURY, supra note 10, at
80-81.
62. Greeson v. Sherman, 265 F. Supp. 340 (W.D. Va. 1967); Maercklein v. Smith,
129 Colo. 72, 266 P.2d 1095 (1954); Patterson v. Vincent, 44 Del. 442, 61 A.2d 416
(Super. Ct. 1948); Trimming v. Howard, 52 Idaho 412, 16 P.2d 661 (1932); Hackworth
v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971); Calhoun v. Gales, 29 App. Div. 2d 766,
287 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1968); Hertgen v. Weintraub, 29 Misc. 2d 396, 215 N.Y.S.2d 379
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Griffin v. Woodhead, 30 R.I. 204, 74 A. 417 (1909); Bodne v. Austin,
156 Tenn. 353, 2 S.W.2d 100 (1928); Suskey v. Davidoff, 2 Wise. 2d 503, 87 N.W.2d
306 (1958).
These courts reason that if the legislature has created a prescriptive period in which
"malpractice" or "personal injury" actions must be brought, then to allow the plaintiff to
recover on a contract theory would be contrary to legislative intent. This argument is
less persuasive when one considers the current trend to allow plaintiffs in tort actions
more time in which to bring suit by running the statute from the time of discovery
(compare with running of statute for contracts from time of breach instead of time dam-
ages are received, note 65 infra and accompanying text). Nevertheless, once discovery is
made, it is the shorter statute of limitations that applies. Comment, The Implied Con-
tract Theory of Malpractice Recovery, 6 WiLLAMErr L1. 275, 282 (1970).
At least one court has construed the shorter "malpractice" statute as applying only
to actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, or those practicing Christian Science,
while the longer "negligence" or tort statute was applied to hospitals. Blastos v. Elliot
Community Hosp., 105 N.H. 9, 200 A.2d 854 (1964).
63. Klema v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E.2d 765 (1960).
64. Camposano v. Claiborn, 2 Conn. Cir. 135, 196 A.2d 129 (2d Dist. 1963);
Robins v. Finestone, 308 N.Y. 543, 127 N.E.2d 330 (1955).
65. Crawford v. Duncan, 61 Cal. App. 647, 215 P. 573 (2d Dist. 1923).
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statute applies; in the case of malpractice actions or an implied contract
to use a requisite standard of due care, the torts statute controls. This
trend corresponds with the preference for treating actions on implied
contract as actions sounding in tort. Both practices reflect a laudable
recognition on the part of courts that the nature of an action on implied
contract is not breach of contract but negligence. Likewise, whether a
cause of action is based on an implied contract to use ordinary skill and
care or an express agreement to cure is a matter of substance, not form.
VI. DAMAGES
Brief mention has been made of the problem of damages in Sulli-
van v. O'Connor,"8 but the problem is complex and deserving of greater
attention, since, as every first year law student knows, a right rises no
higher than its remedy. Remedies for negligence rise considerably
higher than those for breach of contract: the former allowing recovery
for personal injury and pain and suffering, the latter for payments made
and medical expenses incurred, as well as other damages incidental to
the breach.67  As previously pointed out, however, courts have disa-
greed over allowing recovery of pain and suffering damages in contract
actions. 68
In actions for breach of contract the law attempts to put the injured
party in as good a position as he would have been had the contract
been performed. The only real limit to recovery is that the party should
not be placed in a better position than he would have been had the
contract been properly executed . 9 And though most courts allow re-
covery of out-of-pocket expenses,"0 other courts have adopted more
liberal formulations for recovery.
In Hawkins v. McGee,71 the most famous American case on breach
of medical contract, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied an
expectancy measure of damages to compensate the plaintiff. In that
case the defendant physician promised to perform plastic surgery on
66. See text accompanying notes 2-10 supra.
67. Colvin v. Smith, 276 App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949); Miller, supra note
18, at 424.
68. Note 10, supra.
69. Fuller & Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 79
(1936).70. Anclote Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972);
Lake v. Baccus, 59 Ga. App. 656, 2 S.E.2d 121 (1939); Frankel v. Wolper, 181 App.
Div. 485, 169 N.Y.S. 15 (1918), afId, 228 N.Y. 583, 127 N.E. 913 (1920) (per curiam).
71. 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929).
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plaintiffs burned hand and assured plaintiff that the result would be a
"10 0% perfect hand."72 In fact, the result was far from perfect and the
skin grafted onto plaintiff's hand from his chest caused hair to grow on
his palm. Plaintiff brought suit for breach of contract, and the court
found the proper measure to be the difference between the value of a
perfect hand and the value of the hand in its deteriorated condition. The
court awarded no damages for pain and suffering, finding it part of the
legal detriment for the operation.73
The New Hampshire court's adoption of an expectancy measure of
damages in Hawkins has been criticized by one writer as creating the
possibility of an inordinate financial burden on the physician. 74  For
example, damages would clearly be excessive in a case in which the
physician promised to cure the patient of a disease and the disease
proved incurable: the measure of damages would be the difference
between the condition of a healthy patient as promised and the patient
in a dying condition.7" Furthermore, the defendant would be barred
from raising the defenses of mistake or impossibility: in the first in-
stance the mistake would be unilateral; 70 in the second, the defendant
would have reason to know of the impossible nature of the contract.7 7
Yet the New Hampshire court followed the precedent set in
Hawkins in another case of breach of contract just three years later.78
This time plaintiff had contracted with a physician for a series of five
shots which were to be administered at one week intervals. The effect
of the injections was so deleterious, however, that plaintiff could take
only three of them, thus leaving the treatment uncompleted and unsuc-
cessful. Plaintiff was compensated for the difference between the value
of the condition promised and the actual condition "including incidental
consequences fairly subject to contemplation by the parties when the
contract is made." 9 The court conceded that any undue suffering as a
72. Id. at 115, 146 A. at 643.
73. Id. at 118, 146 A. at 644.
74. Miller, supra note 18, at 426.
75. See 2 D. LOuISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, I 18.14, at 562
(Supp. 1975). The possibility of an excessive award being made under an expectancy
measure of damages was pointed out by the Massachusetts court in Sullivan v. O'Connor,
363 Mass. 579, 585-86, 296 N.E.2d 183, 187-88 (1973).
76. See RESTATEMENT oF CONTRACTS § 503 (1932).
77. 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1933 (2d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 456, comment c at 847-48 (1932). On the defenses of impossibility and
mistake see McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932). It should be noted
that if both parties know that the performance of the contract is impossible, the contract
is void. McQuaid v. Michou, supra at 306, 157 A. at 885.
78. McQuaid v. Michou, 85 N.H. 299, 157 A. 881 (1932).
79. Id. at 303, 157 A. at 883.
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result of the three shots could be received in evidence to show the
patient's actual condition, but denied recovery for pain and suffering,
reasoning that it was "a part of the price the plaintiff is ready to pay for
the agreed result."80
In Stewart v. Rudner1 the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled
otherwise. The action was brought in contract against defendants for
failure to perform a Caesarian section on the plaintiff and for perform-
ance of an unauthorized episiotomy. As a result, plaintiff's child was
stillborn. The Michigan court affirmed a lower court award of damages
for pain and suffering as well as loss of wages.82 In discussing the
history of tort and contract damages, the court adverted to the recent
trend to allow recovery for mental suffering in actions ex contractu:
breach of promise to marry, the use of abusive language by railroad
employees, breach of contract of hotel lodgings, and breach of contract
for burial."3 In each of these cases, it is the nature of the injury rather
than the form of the action that determines the measure of damages.
The judge might have added, as have some commentators, that to
use a different measure of damages, depending on whether the action
sounds in tort or contract; is '"wholly irrational, and even the historical
excuse for it is gone with abolition of the various common law forms of
action. ' 84  One scholar has proposed the adoption of a measure of
damages similar to that employed in actions for deceit: using a tort
measure when the harm is essentially needless suffering, and a contract
measure when there has been a failure to perform and no physical harm
has resulted.8 5 Another advocates an expectancy measure including
damages for pain and suffering when they are a forseeable consequence
of the physician's breach; moreover, when the public interest calls for
limiting physicians' liability, courts should feel free to do so.80 While
both suggestions have the virtue of flexibility, there remains the balanc-
ing interest of certainty and evenness of application in the law, which is
yet to be met.
It is suggested that the proper resolution of these problems is to
measure the damages by the nature of the injury rather than by the form
80. Id. at 303, 157 A. at 883; accord, Lakeman v. LaFrance, 102 N.H. 300, 305,
156 A.2d 123, 127 (1959).
81. 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957).
82. Id. at 475-76, 84 N.W.2d at 826-27.
83. Id. at 465-72, 84 N.W.2d at 821-25.
84. 1 D. LotnsELu. & H. WtuAMs, MEDxCAL. MALPRACTICE 8.03, at 198 (1973).
85. Miller, supra note 18, at 428.
86. Note, Express Contracts to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50
IND. L.J. 361, 387 (1975).
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of the action. As in the case of pleadings, it is the substance rather than
the form that should govern, and it makes little sense to deny compensa-
tion for pain and suffering simply because a plaintiff's action sounds in
contract rather than tort.87
VII. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ALLOWING ACTIONS
FOR BREACH OF MEDICAL CONTRACTS
As in every aspect of law, contractual liability for physicians and
surgeons is laden with policy-the balancing of competing interests in
society. The broad considerations in cases such as Sullivan v. O'Connor
are clearly defined: the right to contract versus the need to protect an
often vulnerable profession.
There are persuasive arguments against allowing recovery under
contract theory including the uncertainties of medical practice: to en-
force such contracts would discourage physicians from giving the dis-
87. The case of breach of contract to sterilize poses a peculiar problem in awarding
damages: should the liability extend to the rearing of the child? And is being "blessed
with a child" a mitigating consideration? See generally Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1221
(1972); Note, Remedy for the Reluctant Parent: Physician's Liability for the Post-
Sterilization Conception and Birth of Unplanned Children, 27 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 158
(1974).
In Shaheen v. Knight, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (C.P. 1957), an action was brought for
failure to perform a vasectomy as promised. Damages for the expense of rearing and
educating the child were disallowed. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas felt that
"[tjo allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician would have to
pay for the fun, joy and affection which plaintiff Shaheen will have in the rearing and
educating of this, defendant's [sic] fifth child." Id. at 45-46. A similar result was
reached in Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), in which the
court found that the purpose of an operation to sterilize the husband was to save his wife
from the hazards of childbirth, rather than the expense incident to delivery and
pregnancy. Christensen is not authority, however, for denying recovery on the contract
for expenses of birth or rearing and educating the child when the purpose of the
operation is to limit the family's size. Under such circumstances, the court might have
found the injury to be a foreseeable consequence of the breach. Note, 27 U. FLA. L.
REv., supra at 167-68.
With the current concern about overpopulation, it can be expected that courts'
attitudes toward these cases will change. There is already evidence of a shift in thejudicial wind: in Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971), a
Michigan court ruled that the benefits of an unplanned child may be weighed against all
elements of claimed damages. This holding does not, however, prevent recovery for
expenses incident to the birth of an unwanted child, including recovery for the mother's
lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, pain and anxiety of pregnancy, and the
economic cost of rearing a child. Nor is the plaintiff required to mitigate damages by
aborting the pregnancy or offering the child for adoption. But see Ziemba v. Sternberg,
45 App. Div. 2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974), in which the court found that the right
to an abortion did not coincide with an obligation to have one in order to mitigate
damages. Instead, the obligation may depend on several factors: the stage to which the
pregnancy has progressed, the health and condition of the expectant mother, and the
professional judgment and counsel received.
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traught and fearful patient needed reassurance, retard the advancement
of medical science, foster the practice of "defensive" medicine, and per-
haps punish the doctor who is not at "fault."' 8 In addition, contractual
liability is normally excluded from medical malpractice insurance, thus
placing a potentially large financial burden on the physician.80 Observ-
ers have also emphasized the distinction between contracts made by
physicians and patients and those made in commercial settings, the
former being charcterized by strong public policy and the lack of a
profit motive (the lack of profit motive is debatable, especially in
contracts supported by separate consideration, or in the "no cure, no
pay" contract). 9° Moreover, those arguing against contractual liability
point out that an adequate remedy for negligence is available if physi-
cians incorrectly diagnose or recommend. 9'
Policy arguments favoring ,the enforcement of medical contracts are
equally persuasive: physicians and their patients should have the free-
dom to contract, and if these contracts are not enforced, the public may
be enticed by charlatans to enter into warranties to cure, thus shaking
confidence in the medical profession. 92 Furthermore, a suit in contract
may be the easiest action for plaintiff to litigate and, in many instances,
may be the only remedy available.93
A possible solution to this dilemma is to enforce only particular
types of medical contracts. One commentator has separated these
contracts into two types: the "primary case" in which the physician
employed, the time and place of treatment, the cost of specific
guarantees, and any agreement to administer prescribed treatments are
variables; and the "secondary case" in which there is an emergency and
the bargaining atmosphere of the "primary cae" is lacking. 4 The
"primary case" seems much like a typical commercial transaction, while
the "secondary case" resembles a contract of adhesion. In the first case,
88. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 582-83, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1973);
Guilmet v. Campbell, 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971) (dissenting opinion); Note,
Express Contract to Cure: The Nature of Contractual Malpractice, 50 IND. L.i. 361,
366-67 (1975).
89. Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability, 12 VAm. L. Rpm. 667,
669 (1959); see McGee v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 53 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.
1931); 10 BRooKLYN L. Rv. 411 (1941).
90. Gault v. Sideman, 42 Il. App. 2d 96, 109-10, 191 N.E.2d 436, 443 (1963);
Comment, Establishing the Contractual Liability of Physicians, 7 U.C.D.L. Rav. 84, 90
(1974); Miller, supra note 18, at 434.
91. Comment, 7 U.C.D.L. Rnv., supra note 90, at 90-91 (1974).
92. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (1973).
93. Comment, 7 U.C.D.L. REv., supra note 90, at 93 (1974).
94. Note, 50 IND. L.J., supra note 88, at 371-75 (1975).
[Vol. 54900
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
the article writer concludes that there is no reason why the contract
should not be enforced if the jury finds the existence of a contract. In
the second case, there may be a need to guarantee good results in order
to prepare the patient psychologically for surgery, therefore, the guaran-
tee should not be upheld. 5
Such a distinction does indeed add spice to the problem. But the
solution is only half-baked: it is a matter of deciding not only what
kinds of contracts should be enforced, but also what burden of proof
plaintiff should be required to shoulder. Most courts understandably
prefer the more palatable, albeit blander formula: allowing recovery in
both cases, but only on clear proof of contract. Instructions to the jury
may include tests of truth and consideration of the complexity of the
operation as bearing on the probability that a result was promised.96
IX. CONCLUSION
Given these policy considerations, Sullivan v. O'Connor has set an
important precedent: it has extended the contractual liability of physi-
cians and surgeons by interpreting the physicians' illustration of the
proposed operation as a guarantee of results, and it has awarded dam-
ages for pain and suffering when the contract to cure has been
breached.91 One critic has viewed the Sullivan case with considerable
alarm, finding that the "holding in Sullivan erodes the tort concept of
negligence by sanctioning an identical result with an identical recovery,
without the burden of proving that the defendant was at fault. In so
doing, the Massachusetts court has created the ultimate medical night-
mare.' 98  One solution to the problem created in Sullivan, then, is to
eliminate damages for pain and suffering. 9
But to condition damages for pain and suffering based on the form
of the action rather than the nature of the injury is specious. The
problem created by Sullivan is one not of damages but of proof. In
compensating Alice Sullivan for pain and suffering resulting from an
operation not contracted for, the Massachusetts court made an award
that is not only just but which also follows recent trends in damages in
both contract and tort law.100 Yet on the problem of proof, the court
95. Id.
96. Sullivan v. O'Connor, 363 Mass. 579, 583, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (1973).
97. Note, Contractual Liability in Medical Malpractice-Sullivan v. O'Connor, 24
DEPA L L. REv. 212, 213 (1974).
98. Id. at 225.
99. Id.
100. See part VI, Damages, supra.
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failed to set sufficiently rigid standards for determining the existence of
a contract. The plaintiff's burden of proof is considerably lighter in
actions for contract than in actions for tort: there is no burden of
proving negligence, and there is no hindrance by a "conspiracy of
silence" within the medical community since the case may be presented
as a jury question without obtaining expert medical testimony.' 0'
Responding to this problem of proof, some states have recently
enacted statutes of frauds requiring enforcible medical contracts to be in
writing. 10 2 For states that have no such statutes, it is suggested that a
corroborative evidence rule be adopted. 03 This would place a heavier
burden on the plaintiff to prove the existence of a contract, requiring
corroborative evidence such as a written instrument, separate considera-
tion, or the testimony of witnesses. 04 Even though adoption of such a
rule would sacrifice plaintiffs reliance interest (since under present law,
if defendant has made a promise that plaintiff relies on to his detriment,
defendant is estopped from denying enforceability of the promise), 05
the patient's interest must be balanced against the physician's. A
combination of adopting a stricter burden of proof and a liberal measure
of damages including compensation for pain and suffering will provide
protection for physicians as well as an adequate remedy in contract for
plaintiffs who can show an agreement to cure. Those suing on an
implied agreement to use due care, like those suing for negligence, will
have the traditional remedy in tort.
For the present, attorneys should take notice of the ruling in
Sullivan. For the attorney representing the patient it may provide a
remedy for which there is a lighter burden of proof and, generally, a
longer statutory period in which to bring suit; those presently grazing
exclusively in the realm of torts may find greener pastures in the field of
contracts.
THOMAS MEmms WOODDURY
101. Annot., 43 A.LR.3d 1221, 1227 (1972); Miller, supra note 18, at 417.
102. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.922(g) (Stat. Release No. 1, 1974), amending
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 26.922 (1970); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page, Supp.
1975), amending Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1335.05 (1962); 2 PURDON'S PA. LEGIS. SERV.,
Act No. 111 § 606 (1975).
103. This proposal has been made by at least two other commentators: Note, 50
IND. LJ., supra note 88, at 376-79; Note, Torts-Medical Malpractice-Express War-
ranty of Particular Results of an Operation, 41 TENN. L. REv. 964, 973-74 (1974).
104. Note, 50 IND. L.J., supra note 88, at 376-79.
105. Id.
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